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Planning informality: 
Promoting a market of planned 
informal settlements 
About 30% of the population in developing countries live in informal urban settlements lacking 
adequate basic services, public spaces and urban equipment. The origin to most of these shortcomings 
can be traced to a single feature: the urban layout design. 
1) Human settlements that have not been 
adequately planned tend to prioritize the 
private use of land (housing), and leave 
little for public use (roads, recreational 
areas, urban equipment).
Such an unbalanced distribution of land use 
creates a fundamental problem: once the 
housing is built, the only way to get enough 
space to create roads, water networks, 
parks or schools is through massive 
processes of demolition and relocation; 
an expensive option in social, economic 
and political terms. Therefore, attaining a 
better distribution of land uses—i.e. a more 
rational plot layout—within a few days of 
an informal settlement’s creation could 
substantially improve its developmental 
potential in the long run. 
Regrettably, local and national authorities 
have proven time and again their lack of 
capacity—or willingness—to adequately 
guide processes of urban expansion that 
have been going on for decades all over the 
developing world. Moreover, public agencies 
tend to focus their efforts on policies that 
attempt to remedy the problems created 
by the unplanned occupation of land, not to 
prevent those troubles from arising in the 
first place—in contexts in which informal 
settlements are the main, or even the 
inevitable, drivers of urban expansion.
In order to start working out policies 
and tools that would help to achieve 
better plot layouts, it would be necessary 
to have a clear understanding of the 
internal dynamics of informal settlements 
(unauthorized housing, which may or 
may not involve legal land purchases), 
specifically of how land is distributed for 
public or private use at the very foundation 
of each new ‘spontaneous’ urbanization. 
Hence, we developed a comparative study 
between two very different places that 
experienced intense processes of informal 
occupation during the last 15 years: the 
urban peripheries of Lima (Peru) and Dar 
es Salaam (Tanzania). 
The methodologies involved in our 
research included quantitative techniques, 
such as the estimation of an ‘urban layout 
quality’ index based on ‘optimal’ urban 
parameters, and qualitative methods, such 
as focus groups and in-depth interviews 
with leaders and dwellers of newly 
formed human settlements. Additionally, 
we carried out a historical study on the 
process of informal urbanization in Lima 
between 1960 and 1990.
2) Our fieldwork found that, despite 
the obvious differences between the 
two case studies, the fundamental 
dynamics of land distribution for public 
or private use is very similar in Lima 
and Dar es Salaam. A first finding is 
that the plot layout is entirely managed 
by the supply side of the informal 
settlements’ market.
In the case of Lima, informal settlements 
are created in two types of land: (i) the 
wastelands with no agricultural value that 
surround the city, typically owned by the 
national government; (ii) privately owned 
agricultural land. In the first case a group 
of around 30-150 families simultaneously 
‘invades’ a plot of land; the selection of the 
plot and the ‘recruitment’ of squatters is 
typically carried on by a single person, usually 
a local leader or an informal land dealer.
In the second case, the owners sell the 
land, without urban authorization, to an 
‘association’ or ‘cooperative’ also comprised 
by between 30 and 150 families organized 
by an intermediary. Once the transaction 
is completed, the members of the ‘asso-
ciation’ occupy the land simultaneously, 
‘invasion’ style, because, although they can 
demonstrate a legal purchase of land, they
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do not have the authorization to generate 
a new development.
The fact that occupation is ‘instantaneous’ 
in both cases—which implies that all par-
ticipants must demarcate their individual 
lots practically at the very moment of the 
invasion—means that the power to distri-
bute and place lots lies on the leader or 
organizer, who controls the ‘supply’ of land. 
Beyond the personal gains that may or may 
not be extracted from the occupation pro-
cess, organizers have legitimate incentives 
to maximize the portion of land dedicated 
to housing: on the one hand, for the new 
settlement to prosper money has to be 
raised from settlers (through fees) so roads 
can be built, rough terrain can be flattened, 
and bribes can be paid—and more settlers 
means more money. On the other hand, 
the settlement requires a critical mass of 
dwellers, capable of exerting political pres-
sure on local governments and, eventually, 
obtaining public services and infrastructure.
In Dar es Salaam, urban expansion occurs 
mainly in actual or potential agricultural 
land, with an intrinsic value and proper 
owners (usually peasants with ancestral 
property rights). Here, the lots for housing 
are delimited, sold and occupied one 
family at the time, through intermediaries 
(‘middlemen’) who use informal networks to 
attract potential buyers—which means that 
the simultaneous and massive occupation 
of land plots, that is a defining feature of 
informal settlements in Lima, does not occur 
in Dar es Salaam. In this case, both landlords 
and middlemen (who get a fixed percentage 
of the lot price) have obvious economic 
incentives to sell as many lots for housing 
as possible. Thus, both in Lima and Dar es 
Salaam the system of incentives favors the 
private use of land over public uses.
3) A second characteristic shared by the 
case studies is that the ‘demand side’ 
of informal settlements—the actual or 
potential dwellers—is wholly aware of the 
importance of preserving enough space for 
public uses, and of the problems generated 
in the long term by failing to do so.
Furthermore, in all the focus groups and 
interviews conducted in new human 
settlements in Lima and in Dar es Salaam, 
dwellers declared having been aware of 
this issue at the time of the occupation 
of what are now their homes, and 
to be currently suffering the negative 
consequences of not having reserved 
enoughspace for public uses.
According to them, there are two reasons 
why land uses could not be better allocated 
at the time of the informal occupation: 
First, at that moment people are solely 
focused on securing and building their 
individual lot—that is, on those early days 
people apply a high discount rate to public 
spaces, temporarily reducing its perceived 
value and priority. Second, the ‘supply side’ 
of new settlements did not offer them the 
option of choosing to settle on a plot of 
land where spaces had been explicitly and 
clearly reserved for public uses.
In this regard, an important finding of 
our field work is that, when asked about 
their disposition to pay a higher price (or 
fee) to obtain lots in a ‘planned’ informal 
urbanization (with enough spaces reserved 
for public use), most of the participants in 
the focus groups answered affirmatively—
both in Lima and in Dar es Salaam. 
Moreover, it was clear for everybody that 
the costs of living in a chaotic, badly 
planned neighborhood far outweighed the 
costs of a higher down payment. 
The magnitude for such a premium has not 
been measured, although several sources 
in Dar es Salaam cited examples of semi-
planned informal settlements in which 
the land value more than doubled that of 
neighboring, properly unplanned areas. 
4)  This finding suggests that conditions 
could be met to create a market of 
‘planned’ informal settlements—which 
would greatly reduce the costs that a 
chaotic urban sprawl generates for new 
settlers and for society in general.
For this market to develop—and to reach an 
equilibrium that allows it to grow without 
state intervention—it would be necessary 
to properly align the potential supply and 
demand.  On the demand side, it would be 
necessary to reduce the discount rate that 
is applied to the value of public spaces at 
the time of occupation. This could be mean 
an awareness campaign that strengthens 
the intuitions people already have regarding
Figure 1. Urban expansion in Lima and Dar es Salaam
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the convenience of reserving space for public 
uses when creating a new neighborhood.
On the supply side, the key task would be to 
incorporate the value of the land reserved 
for public uses in the price of lots sold for 
housing—which would mean, according to 
our estimates, an increase of between 15 
and 35 percent of the ‘unplanned’ price per 
square meter. Only in this way the ‘invasion’ 
organizers or the landlords would get the 
incentives to set aside more space for public 
uses, and would be able to verify whether 
demand exists to justify such effort. For this 
to happen, however, the supply side of infor-
mal settlements must be able to plan its plots 
before selling or allocating lots for housing.
5) How to ‘plan’ an informal settlement? 
Our historical research gave us some 
clues, based on the experience of the 
informal settlements that emerged in 
Lima between the early 1960s and the 
late 1980s. Over that period, the Peruvian 
government applied a permissive policy 
regarding informal settlements, allowing 
de facto occupations, and offering a path 
for legalizing property and urbanization 
rights tied to a simple condition: that 
lots would be rearranged following plot 
plans that met basic urban parameters.
The result of this policy, as can be easily 
verified by reviewing satellite photos of 
the aforementioned neighborhoods, were 
regular urban grids, with lined up plots, 
proper roads and reserved areas for urban 
infrastructure and facilities, which greatly 
facilitated subsequent urban consolidation.
Not only does a plot plan clearly demarcate 
lots for housing—which reduces potential 
conflicts between future neighbors—and 
land for public uses, but it also makes it fea-
sible to respect such limits by making them 
explicit and precise. Therefore, the plot plan 
provides as much credibility as possible to 
the offer of a ‘planned’ informal settlement.
6) Our findings helped us develop a 
series of tools designed to facilitate and 
encourage the creation and consolidation
of demand and supply sides for a market of 
planned informal settlements.
These tools include a series of awareness 
videos (both for potential ‘buyers’ and for 
‘sellers’ of land); a manual for drawing 
plot plans, designed for the people 
responsible for distributing lots of land in 
new settlements—based on appropriate 
planning parameters; and a free mobile 
application, the Lotizer, which automatically 
generates basic, but functional and rational 
plot plans for any piece of land identified 
by the user in Google Maps1. This ‘toolbox’ 
can be found and downloaded, both in 
Swahili and Spanish, on the following page: 
www.grade.org.pe/lotizer.
1 The current version of the Lotizer, although 
functional, requires several adjustments to reach 
its full potential, such as including topographic 
data in its algorithms, or restrictions for its use 
in protected or high-risk areas, among other 
improvements. The current version should be 
considered as a proof of concept.
Los “compradores” 
potenciales elevan el valor 
presente asignado a 
urbanizaciones informales 
planificadas.
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Figure 2. Creation process of a planning informal urbanization market
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Policy recommendations: tools for 
the development of a market for 
planned informal settlements 
An optimal policy of urban 
expansion (e.g. massive popular 
housing programs) would end 
informal or unplanned occupation 
of the territory. But if the state 
does not have the economic or 
political conditions to guide or 
regulate the expansion of cities, 
it is at least necessary to mitigate 
the negative consequences of 
disorderly informal urbanization. 
One issue that has profound 
effects on the future of informal 
settlements-and one that is 
relatively easy to improve-is the 
initial design of the urban layout 
of these neighborhoods. As we 
have shown in these pages, the 
conditions are given to promote 
the creation of a market for 
‘planned’ informal settlements. 
The state can help develop this 
market with some simple actions:
• Offer subsidized plot plans to 
anyone who wants to urbanize 
in the periphery of cities-the 
social costs of not having a timely 
plot plan are infinitely greater 
than the cost of drawing up a 
plan. An alternative would be to 
develop and fine-tune tools such 
as the Lotizer, accessible to all and 
that fulfill the aforementioned 
function.  
• Establish incentives for private 
planning of new neighborhoods, 
e.g. put as a condition that, to 
access basic services, these 
urbanizations have an urban layout 
that meets minimum urbanistic 
parameters and that public spaces 
are respected.  
• Develop awareness campaigns 
for the supply and demand of 
informal settlements, explaining 
the benefits of a well-distributed 
neighborhood, and offer tools to 
carry out a minimal planning. 
• Evidently, none of the above can 
be directed directly to illegal land 
invasions. However, if the ‘legal’ 
informal occupations begin to be 
‘planned’, it is to be expected that 
the invasions will also do so-for a 
simple matter of competition.  
• Finally, it would be convenient 
to quantify the social costs of 
urban expansion in the long 
term, which could help justify the 
implementation of optimal policies 
to gradually reduce the informal 
occupation of territories. 
If this market emerged, a new 
equilibrium could be reached in 
which the city could continue 
to expand without direct state 
intervention, and with a better 
order and possibilities for future 
consolidation.
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Analysis & Proposals addresses various 
issues of Peruvian reality based on 
GRADE’s research findings and offers 
public policy recommendations.                                       
The content of this policy brief does 
not necessarily reflect the institutional 
view of GRADE or donors. This and other 
GRADE’s publications are available in                  
www.grade.org.pe/en/publications
This policy brief is based on the key 
findings of Alvaro Espinoza and Ricardo 
Fort, «The processes of spontaneous 
urbanization in the absence of the State», 
in collaboration with the Economic and 
Social Research Foundation, Tanzania. 
The  study and the publication holding 
the former were undertook with funds 
designated from the International 
Development Research Centre, Canada, 
through the Think Tank Initiative.
Figure 3. From a mobile app to a plot plan
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